



AUTHORS: ~ate Professor, College of Agriculture, The University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602.
REFERENCE: Proceedings of the 1989 Georgia Water Resources Conference, held May 16 and 17, 1989, at the Georgia Center for Continuing
~ducation, Kathryn J. Hatcher, Ed., Institute of Natural Resources, The University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia, 1989.
Contamination of groundwater continues to gain
increased attention due to numerous discoveries of
hazardous waste materials and the identification of toxic
chemicals in water supplies. Although much of the
reported contamination involves spills and point source
pollution, additional nonpoint sources including
agricultural production contribute to the problem. The
threat of liability for injuries from the contamination of
groundwater by agricultural producers who apply
pesticides to their crops has led the American Farm
Bureau Federation to advance exemption legislation.
This legislation would exempt producers from liability
for their contamination so long as they" we~e not
negligent, reckless, or misusing a chemical.
This paper addresses groundwater contamination
liability legislatiqn, including· new legislation passed in
Georgia in 1988, and factors that contribute to a fair
and efficient apportionment of liability for damages
from agricultural producers using pesticides. Economic
models of strict liability and negligence are contrasted
to demonstrate the impact of the new exemption
legislation. These models are related to four major sets
of rules for responding to groundwater contamination
under American law: entitlements, property rules,
liability rules, and inalienability rules.
Notwithstanding the fact that it is difficult to
delineate a preferred response for all types of pollution,
the model and factors concerning groundwater
contamination suggest that improvements in efficiency
can be achieved through changes of existing liability
legislation. In the absence of unilateral precaution, the
strict liability rules in effect for groundwater
contamination in many U.S. states may not offer a very
efficient solution. Rather, a liability rule based on
negligence may be preferable. Comparative negligence
". may minimize evidentiary uncertainty and respond to
risk aversion, although this depends on the symmetry of
precaution. The cheapest cost avoider may impact what
type of negligence solution is superior.
However, it is not clear that the adoption of
exemptions for producers' pesticide usage are premised
on social welfare or efficiency justifications. Any
possible enhancement of efficiency between producers
and victims may be negated by social losses. Moreover,
the legislation does nothing to respond to the growing
concern about groundwater contamination. Legislatures
that desire to provide a better resolution for damages
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from pesticide usage contamination should consider
alternative solutions rather than rely on liability rules.
Modifications of entitlements to incorporate pollution
charges or marketable water pollution rights may offer
superior mechanisms to provide economic incentives to
reduce contamination.
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